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Abstract
We study the effects of grade retention on secondary school performance by considering
a change in Colombia’s educative legislation. In 2010, the rule that forced schools to re-
tain up to a 5% of students was abolished. Exploiting variation in schools’ retention rates
in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that retained (marginally non-retained)
students improve (decline) their performance on language but not on math test scores.
We suggest the school’s position in the retention distribution, and the proportion of in-
experienced teachers in the classroom, can be the mechanisms by which the marginally
decreasing returns of grade retention are determined. (JEL I20, I24, J24)
∗Ferreira: Research Center for Education and the Labor Market, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200
MD, Maastricht, the Netherlands (e-mail: m.ferreirasequeda@maastrichtuniversity.nl); Golsteyn and Parra-Cely:
School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, the Netherlands
(e-mail: b.golsteyn@maastrichtuniversity.nl, and s.parracely@maastrichtuniversity.nl). This research is partly
financed by a VIDI grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The authors are
grateful to Lex Borghans, Giorgio Brunello, Andries de Grip, Caroline Hoxby, Olivier Marie, Annemarie Ku¨nn-
Nelen, Steffen Ku¨nn and participants at the Maastricht University’s Workshop in Economics, the 32nd conference
of the European Society for Population Economics in Antwerp, and the 9th IWAEE workshop in Catanzaro for
invaluable comments and suggestions. We also thank the Colombian Inspectorate of Education (ICFES), the
National Bureau of Statistics (DANE) and the CEDE institute at Universidad de los Andes, Colombia, for sharing
their datasets and school-identifiers on the SABER11 test and the C-600 census.
1
I. Introduction
Retention in school is common and widespread,1 but its consequences for school performance
are theoretically unclear and empirically diverse. Effects can be expected both for retained and
non-retained students. For the retained, there may be positive effects as repeating a grade can
help to acquire basic knowledge needed to perform well later on. But retention may instead
also have negative effects on school performance if, for instance, self-esteem and motivation
decrease as a result. For non-retained students, the relationship between grade retention and
performance works via different mechanisms. In principle, students at the upper end of the abil-
ity distribution may learn more as the level of teaching adjusts accordingly if weaker students in
class are retained. A positive effect of retention at the lower end of the ability distribution may
be that the threat of being held back can stimulate children to work harder in school.2 But this
threat may also have negative consequences, as there is a negative correlation between mental
stress and academic performance. Taken together, empirical research on the effect of retention
on school performance is needed as its expected effects are ambiguous from a theoretical point
of view.
An important empirical challenge in studying the relationship between grade retention and
school performance is that omitted variables may drive the relationship. For instance, high
ability children may be less likely to be retained and may also obtain higher school grades.
This implies that a naı¨ve estimation of the effect of retention on academic achievement may
be negatively (positively) biased for retained (non-retained) students. In this paper, we propose
a framework to recover the causal effect of grade retention on secondary school performance
of retained and non-retained students, which combines both administrative data and students’
academic records. Specifically, we analyze the effect of retention in 10th grade on performance
in 11th grade, the last year in secondary school (nominal age: 16-17), using two administrative
datasets from Colombia. The first, provided by the Inspectorate of Education, includes data for
all students in the country on scores from a centralized exam in the last year of secondary edu-
cation. The second dataset, from the central statistics office, contains information on retention
rates across all schools and grades in the education system. We are able to link the two datasets
using unique school identifiers.
To overcome the endogeneity problem aforementioned, we exploit a policy change with
respect to retention. From 2002 to 2009, under the automatic promotion policy regime, schools
were by law not allowed to retain more than 5 percent of their students. In 2010, this directive
was abolished and since then, schools are free to decide how many pupils should repeat a grade.
The abolishment of the law increased retention rates dramatically in some schools, while in oth-
1In the United States, around 10 percent of all students are retained between kindergarten and eighth grade.
In Germany and France, respectively 9 and 18 percent of all students are retained in primary school (Fruehwirth
et al., 2016).
2One may also argue that this threat leads to other effects. Belot and Vandenberghe (2014) exploit a law reform
to find that an enhanced threat of grade retention does not lead to better medium-term outcomes.
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ers it had no effect. We use this information in a difference-in-differences approach, in which
treatment and control groups are defined by the above-median historical increase in retention
attributed to the law change, analogue to the method used in recent papers in a different context
than ours (Havnes and Mogstad 2011; Bauernschuster et al. 2016). Schools in which retention
rates increased more than the median change are labeled the treatment group and those that
responded less than the median, the control group. Several placebo and falsification tests show
that trends in math and language test scores are similar in control and treatment schools before
the law was repealed, indicating that we can use a difference-in-differences model to estimate
the causal effects of increased retention on school performance.
Our findings indicate that students who have been exposed to higher retention rates one
(two) year(s) before taking the high-school exit exam obtained lower (higher) scores on the
language test. In contrast, we observe no significant effects on math scores. We attribute the
effects of 1-year and 2-years prior increased retention exposure to marginally non-retained stu-
dents, and retained students, respectively. Additional estimations, where we classify students
between those who were plausibly retained (age at exam: 18 years old or older) and non-
retained (age at exam: 17 years old or younger) corroborate this interpretation of the results.
When analyzing the results across the distribution of language scores we find that especially
low performing, retained students benefited from increased retention. These results suggest that
by repeating a class, students at the lower end of the ability distribution get a more thorough
understanding of the material which enables them to perform better later on. Distinguishing be-
tween low, middle and highly treated schools reveals the non-linearity of the effect of retention:
in middle treated schools, i.e. schools that moderately increased retention, the improvement is
more pronounced than in highly treated schools. These results imply that increased retention
not only has marginal decreasing returns, but also that some schools may be retaining students
at nearly optimal levels.
For marginally non-retained students, the effects of increased retention are negative on lan-
guage scores, especially at the lower end of the test performance distribution. These results
remain both qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the inclusion of potentially important
control variables, clustering of standard errors at the school level, and when performing other
robustness checks. Theoretically, there are several reasons for this negative effect. Firstly, there
might be a positive selection effect for non-retained students that is dominated by the plausibly
negative influence of less able peers in the classroom. Secondly, students may strategically sub-
stitute effort between stem and non-stem subjects as the probability of repeating a grade rises.
Decreasing marginal productivity in both courses implies that math scores are not expected to
increase as much as language scores decrease.
While the above explanations are plausible, we cannot test them as our sources of informa-
tion do not contain data on individual retention outcomes, intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, and/or
individual effort across academic subjects. Instead, our analysis is focused on school-driven
mechanisms that might explain the impacts we identify for retained and marginal students
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alike. We provide evidence that neither average class size nor teachers’ average educational
achievements are relevant to explain these findings. In contrast, increasing participation of
positively selected, inexperienced teachers in the classroom seems to be the amplifying force
behind the benefits and costs of increased retention. Newly hired teachers are highly motivated
but their effort may be (strategically or not) directed to fulfilling the educational needs of good
students, at the expense of the less able pupils.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in various disciplines that have studied the ef-
fects of retention on school performance. Several articles in School Psychology and Sociology
of Education analyze the relationship between grade retention and later school performance,
mostly reporting this relationship to be negative. McCoy and Reynolds (1999) report that re-
tention has a negative relationship with reading achievement. Jimerson et al. (1997) find no
evidence that retention is related to school performance. Jimerson (1999) follows students for
21 years in a longitudinal study to show that retained students have worse educational and em-
ployment outcomes in late adolescence. Silberglitt et al. (2006) find that retained students made
less educational progress compared to a random group of other students. Stearns et al. (2007)
report that students who repeat a grade prior to high school have a higher risk of dropping out
of high school than students who are continuously promoted. An important caveat is that these
articles report correlations and not causal estimates. Although correlations are informative, im-
portant confounders may bias such estimates. As previously explained, we expect a downward
(upward) bias for retained (non-retained) students.
There is a small but growing literature that estimates the causal effect of grade retention on
subsequent educational outcomes.3 The literature reveals that results are mixed, documenting
positive as well as negative estimates. The results depend on the context and age of students.
Firstly, some papers study the effects of retention at young ages. Koppensteiner (2014) ex-
amines the effect of automatic grade promotion on academic achievement (math scores) at
primary school in Brazil. Applying a difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation
over time and across schools in the grade promotion regime, the author finds a negative and
significant effect of about seven percent of a standard deviation on math test scores. Frue-
hwirth et al. (2016) evaluate the effect of retention on achievement using data from children
in kindergarten. Accounting for dynamic selection into retention, they find that children who
are retained in kindergarten would have performed as much as 27 percent higher on math and
reading tests in the next year if they had not been retained. Jacob and Lefgren (2004) instead
find positive effects of retention at an early age. They assess the effects of retention in the
Chicago Public School system using variation in retention generated by a test-based promotion
3There may also be peer effects of retention. Hill (2014) investigates the extent to which course repeaters in
high school mathematics courses exert negative externalities on their course-mates. Using individual and school-
specific course fixed effects to control for ability and course selection, the study shows that increasing the share
of repeaters in each course results in a moderate, significant increase in the probability of course failure for first-
time course-takers. Results suggest that the negative effect is only evident when the share of repeaters reaches a
threshold of 5 to 10 percent of the total number of course-takers.
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policy, and find that retention has a modest but positive net impact on test scores for third grade
students, while it increases academic achievement for low-achieving third graders. However,
they also find that retention appears to have little or no effects for sixth-grade students.
Secondly, some studies have assessed the effects of retention on achievement in high school.
A first set of papers reports negative effects. Jacob and Lefgren (2009) show that retention
among younger students (sixth grade) does not affect the likelihood of high school completion,
but retaining low-achieving eighth grade students in elementary school increases the probabil-
ity that these students will drop out of high school. Manacorda (2012) studies the effects of
retention in secondary junior high school (grades 7 to 9) in Uruguay on dropout rates and school
attainment, exploiting a discontinuity established by a rule of automatic grade failure for pupils
with more than three failed subjects at the end of the school year. The analysis reveals that
retention increases school dropout and reduces school attainment. While analyses in secondary
education focus mostly on dropout rates or completion of school, Garcı´a-Pe´rez et al. (2014)
measure the effect of grade retention on Spanish students’ PISA math scores at age 15, using
the student’s quarter of birth as an instrumental variable. They find that grade retention has a
negative impact on educational outcomes. Those who are retained during primary education
suffer more than those retained in secondary school.
Contrary to these findings, a second set of papers provides estimates of positive effects
of retention in high school. Mahjoub (2017) finds large positive effects of retention on test
scores: around 1.6 times the standard deviation of the achievement gain, using quarter of birth
as an instrument. The average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) ranges between
one and one-quarter of a standard deviation of the test scores. Grade repetition in junior high
school is also shown to increase the probability of graduation by 2.5 percentage points. Eide
and Showalter (2001) use an instrumental variable for retention based on exogenous variation
across states in kindergarten entry dates to find tentative evidence that retention may benefit
students by both lowering dropout rates and raising labor market earnings. They find these
effects to be relevant for white students, but not for black students.
A common approach in these studies is that the benefits of retention are evaluated at the
margin where retention was increased by the natural experiment. An important issue with
this approach is that the estimated benefits may differ at other moments of the distribution of
students. For low performing students, the benefits of repeating a class may be positive while
for high performing students there are probably negative effects. Schools are aware of this and
aim to retain students until the marginal student does not benefit from retention.
The main contribution of our study is that we analyze the non-linearity of the effect of
retention on test scores at various moments of the ability distribution. We show that modest
increases in retention lead to higher scores in language for the retained students, but when many
students are retained, such gains decrease.
This analysis further contributes to the literature studying the effects of retention on ed-
ucational outcomes. Firstly, by separately analyzing the effects of retention for retained and
5
marginally non-retained students. As indicated earlier on, the expected effects of retention are
different for these groups. To evaluate the costs or benefits of retention for society, it is impor-
tant to take the effects for both groups into consideration. Second, we also test transmission
mechanisms at the school level, highlighting the role of teachers’ staff composition on deter-
mining the differentials in test scores we observe as an outcome of increased retention. Third,
our empirical approach to elicit causal effects departs from most other papers in this literature.
We exploit the effects of a law change, which enabled schools to retain more children. Fi-
nally, we provide evidence on the effect of retention for a developing economy using a large
administrative dataset, representative of the Colombian educational system.
Closest to our approach is the analysis developed by Koppensteiner (2014), who examines
the effect of automatic grade promotion on academic achievement (math scores) in primary
schools in Brazil using a difference-in-differences approach. Besides that we evaluate effects
of retention separately for retained and non-retained students, and that we study the effects
in secondary education and not in primary education, our study differs from his in the sense
that we can show with placebo tests that the pre-treatment trends in school performance are
common in treatment and control groups, i.e. the key underlying assumption of the difference-
in-differences framework. Koppensteiner (2014) shows instead that school and student charac-
teristics of treatment and control groups tend to be similar before the treatment occurred.
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section II summarizes the Colombian context and the
educational reform we exploit. Section III discusses the empirical strategy in detail. Section IV
describes our main sources of information, and the final dataset. Our central findings, including
relevant robustness checks, are presented in Section V. Section VI offers a discussion on the
transmission mechanisms. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. Institutional Background
A. The Colombian Educational System
Colombia has an eleven-year system of elementary and secondary education, consisting of five
years of primary school (1st to 5th grade), four years of lower secondary education (6th to 9th
grade) and two years of upper secondary education (10th to 11th grade).4 The expected age
of entry to 1st grade is six years.5 Therefore, if children are not retained, they are expected to
complete their secondary education at ages 16-17.
4Elementary and secondary education in Colombia is offered in two school calendars: A calendar labeled “A”
that runs from February until November, and a calendar “B” from September to June. Most schools (92%) in the
country operate in calendar A. Formal education is also offered by schools in three different class-schedules: a
morning schedule, an afternoon schedule, and a full-day schedule. Students opt or are allocated by the school
to attend either one of these. Most students in secondary education attend school either in the morning or the
afternoon schedule (78%).
5This age is suggested but not mandatory as in Colombia there are no compulsory age-at-school entry laws.
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The educational system in Colombia is a comprehensive school system with no academic
tracking at any grade.6 However, at the start of upper secondary education, schools differen-
tiate in the provision of additional courses to complement the compulsory curriculum set by
the Ministry of Education. These additional courses are organized in two specialization pro-
grams: one is more academic and the other more technical in nature. The academic program
provides general education in arts, sciences and humanities, whereas the technical program pro-
vides vocational knowledge and practice in technology, craft industry, business, pedagogics, or
agriculture.
Upon completion of the 11th grade of secondary school, all students, regardless of the cho-
sen program, participate in a national standardized exam (“SABER11,” in Spanish), an achieve-
ment and competency test that is administered every year by the National Institute for the As-
sessment of Education (“ICFES,” in Spanish).7 This exam is a high-stakes evaluation, required
not only for admission to tertiary education, but also to receive the high-school diploma. This
test is also widely considered as the reference examination to evaluate the quality of secondary
education across the country. In line with previous literature on grade retention, we focus on
students’ performance on the math and language parts of the test as the main outcome of our
analyses.
B. The Automatic Promotion Policy Rule (AUP)
In 2002, by mandate of the Ministry of Education (Decree 230 of 2002), schools were each
year permitted to retain up to a maximum of five percent of their students. This retention policy
was implemented to reduce costs attributed to higher retention rates (i.e. low performance,
low motivation, dropouts, etc.) without compromising the quality of education provided by
the system (Martı´nez and Herrera, 2002). According to the policy mandate, a student should
have been retained if at least one of the following three circumstances occurred: i) the student
received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation in three or more academic subjects in the
current academic year, ii) the student received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation in math
and/or language courses during the current and two previous grades, or iii) the student failed
to attend at least 25% of all academic activities during the current academic year. However,
schools were required to adjust their evaluation standards to comply with the law, which forced
them to promote at least 95% of all their students.
While the reform was marketed as moderately successful in terms of reducing school
dropouts, the incentives to underperform at school as perceived by schools, teachers, and par-
ents, led the Ministry of Education to revoke the Automatic Promotion Policy Rule.8 In Febru-
ary 2009, the 5% retention restriction was replaced by the Ministry of Education through a
6The Ministry of Education regulates all levels of education and national exams for both publicly and privately
funded schools.
7Hereafter, we will refer to this institute as the Inspectorate of Education.
8Ministry of Education, Press Release April 17, 2009.
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new regulation mandate (Decree 1290 of 2009), allowing schools from 2010 onwards to re-
tain as many students as they considered necessary, and thereby giving them more discretion
in their evaluation and promotion procedures. We use the terms Automatic Promotion Policy
(AUP) to indicate the period until 2009 and Free Retention Policy (FRP) from 2010 onwards.
Overall, the abolition of the AUP regime increased students’ retention rates across all grades of
secondary education from 4.3 percent to 7.7 percent, on average, in all schools in the country.
III. Empirical Strategy
We evaluate the effects of retention in 10th grade on math and language performance in the
secondary school exit exam conducted at 11th grade. The empirical challenge in studying
this question is that omitted variables may drive the relationship. A naı¨ve estimation using
OLS may be negatively biased for retained students if the lower scores they obtain are not
due to retention but to their lower ability. As students’ ability increases, we might expect the
benefits of grade retention to be decreasing and, for the upper end of the ability distribution,
to negatively impact academic performance. Nonetheless, such counterproductive effects may
be veiled by, for instance, the positive sorting of skilled students in subsequent grades as a
byproduct of increased retention.
We exploit a policy change in Colombia that occurred in 2010 and implied that schools
facing constraints in their retention requirements (AUP regime) were allowed to retain as many
students as they considered appropriate (FRP regime). To identify the effect of grade retention
on test scores, we implement a difference-in-differences framework which exploits the school-
year variation on retention rates.
Schools reacted differently to the new policy, suggesting that the grade retention effect is
heterogeneous across schools with similar characteristics. We classify schools in two groups:
the treated group, consisting of schools that increase their retention rates after the law change,
and the control group, composed by schools in which retention rates remained relatively con-
stant. We classify schools into the treated or control categories using the difference between
the schools’ average retention rate at 10th grade between both policy regimes, the AUP regime
(2007-2009) and the FRP regime (2010-2012). Sorting schools on this difference, we define
the treated group as the pool of schools with an above-median increase in their retention rates,
and the remaining schools are labeled the control group.9 Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the re-
tention rates for treated and control schools across years. In control schools, on average, such
rates decreased slightly after the law change by approximately 1.4 percentage points. In con-
trast, treated schools increased retention rates by 7.6 percentage points, implying that the latter
retained 9.0 percentage points more than control schools.
9This treatment-control classification is increasingly implemented in the economics literature. Examples of
this strategy are provided by Havnes and Mogstad (2011) and Bauernschuster et al. (2016). These authors analyze
the effects of increased child care coverage on parental economic outcomes.
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Additionally, We classify treated schools based on quintiles of the difference in retention
rates. Panel (b) in Figure 1 shows the retention rates across time for the four quintile groups
in which schools raise retention during the FRP regime. First, we observe that retention rates
among schools in the second quintile barely change. These schools can be considered as an
alternative “control” group. Second, we observe three groups of schools (quintiles 3 to 5) that
are affected differently by the policy change. Since retention rates in these groups increase
on average by 2, 6, and 12 percentage points, we label these schools as low treated, medium
treated, and highly treated, respectively. Furthermore, we observe schools in the first quintile
as a group of defiant schools since they decrease retention rates by 4 percentage points. As
we consider these schools not being fully comparable with the universe of compliant schools,
we decided to exclude them only from this specific analysis.10 With the exception of this latter
group, all remaining schools retained students in the AUP regime as required, with an average
retention rate of 3.6 percent.
The baseline difference-in-differences specification we implement is:
Yst = αs+δt +
2
∑
h=1
γh[Groups×FRPt−h]+βXst + εst , (1)
in which Yst denotes standardized test scores for school s in exam year t. αs and δt are fixed
effects by school and exam year, respectively. Groups is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for
schools in the treated group, and zero for schools in the control group. In our basic specification,
treated schools (Treateds) are those with above median changes in retention rates and control
schools with a below-median change in retention rates. In our more elaborate specification, we
include three treatment dummies corresponding to low treated (LowTreateds), medium treated
(MiddleTreateds), and high treated schools (HighTreateds). FRPt−h is an indicator variable
with value 1 if the FRP regime was in place h years before exam year t, and zero otherwise.
The interaction term Groups×FRPt−h therefore measures the variation in tests scores that can
be causally attributed to the shift in the retention policy from year t − h onwards. For each
regression, we run two specifications. First we run our regressions without covariates. Second,
for each exam year we include covariates for the first two lags of school-specific attributes
that change over time. In this way, we account for pre-FRP variation in characteristics among
schools. This set of control variables is denoted in the equation as Xst . Finally, ε are standard
errors clustered at the school level.
We aim to analyze the effects of increased retention separately for retained and non-retained
students. However, it is worth explaining how we obtain these effects as we do not observe
individual retention outcomes (see more on this point in the data overview section). The cohort
of students taking the exam in year t is largely composed of two types of students: i) 10th grade
10Namely, we keep all observations in our estimations, but we refrain from interpreting effects for schools in the
defiant group. This restriction in the our analyses is only relevant when we account for the heterogeneous effects
of retention. In contrast, results involving treated and control schools classified by the use of the above-median
increase in retention correspond to all schools in our sample.
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students in year t−1 that were promoted to 11th grade at year t, and ii) 10th grade students that
were retained in year t−2, repeated and passed 10th grade in year t−1, and finally enrolled to
11th grade in year t. Hence, our parameters of interest are γ1 and γ2.
The first parameter measures the effect of being exposed one year to the FRP policy in
10th grade on schools’ tests scores in 11th grade the next year. The expected direction of this
effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the sign of γ1 reveals whether non-retained students
benefited from higher retention rates because of a positive sorting effect. In such a case we
expect the effect to be positive. On the other hand, if we interpret this coefficient as the effect
of increased retention on the marginal student (i.e. students that should have been retained but
were promoted by a very small margin), we might expect the impact to have the opposite sign
relative to the effect of retention on the retained students, For instance, if the latter effect is
positive, marginal students are worse off when promoted to 11th grade because they will miss
the chance to receive further training on the academic subjects they struggled with the most.
The second parameter γ2 measures the impact of FRP regime’s exposure in the previous two
consecutive years on schools’ test scores. Assuming that students are retained in 10th grade
only once, this impact can be mostly attributed to retained students. Because of our treatment-
control classification, γ1 and γ2 are best interpreted as intention-to-treat effects (ITT). To obtain
the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), we will rescale these coefficients by the
difference in retention rates between treated and control schools implied by the law change.
The main identification assumption in this setting is that the variation in retention rates
is orthogonal to expected changes in test scores. This assumption is equivalent to claim that
treatment and control schools would have shared similar trends in test scores if the retention
policy had remained the same. We formulate an alternative specification to test this assumption:
Yst = αs+δt +
2010
∑
k=2008
µk[Groups× (Year = k)]
+
2013
∑
k=2011
θk[Groups× (Year = k)]+βXst + εst . (2)
In equation (2), the null hypothesis of interest is that pre-FRP differences in trends between
treated and control units are not significantly different from zero (i.e. µ2008 = µ2009 = µ2010 =
0). Namely, we control for the interaction between the treatment status and those exam years
where test takers, by construction, were not exposed to increased retention rates because of the
policy change. As we will elaborate further on, we are not able to reject such hypothesis at
conventional significance levels.
In addition to the above specification, we also perform placebo tests to account for artificial
policy changes that should not have any effect on test scores:
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Yst = αs+δt +
2
∑
h=1
pih[Groups×FakeFRPk,t−h]+βXst + εst . (3)
In equation (3), FakeFRPk,t−h is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the FRP regime
was in place during year t−h, assuming it (artificially) started either in k = 2008 or k = 2009.
By not being able to reject the null hypothesis of non-significant effects (i.e. pi1 = pi2 = 0), we
are confirming that the changes in test scores can be attributed to the elimination of the AUP
regime only.
IV. Data Overview
Ideally, a suitable dataset to identify the causal effect of grade retention on school performance
should meet two conditions: First, information on individual retention needs to be available.
Second, variation on retention outcomes needs to be as good as random. For example, suppose
that the Ministry of Education randomizes the obligation to retain no more than 5% of students
across all schools at an specific date. Then, if schools’ attributes and outcomes have been
followed through time, it is straightforward to adopt a difference-in-differences framework to
recover the effect of such a policy intervention. A variant of this experimental setting, in a panel
data structure, would be that the compliance to the retention law in time changes randomly
across schools with similar characteristics.
Our dataset does not contain individual level retention data. However, this does not pose
a threat to our study as we are able to recover school-level retention rates from administrative
sources. As we use retention rates at 10th grade, the pool of test-takers in our sample consists
of non-retained students and students who were retained in 10th grade only once. Controlling
for the first two lags of our “FRP regime exposure” variable, we can differentiate the effect
for each type of pupil. The second requirement is fulfilled since, conditional to the schools’
treatment-control classification discussed before, variation in retention rates is attributed to the
policy change alone.
A. Sources of Information and Sample Selection
The sample we use in this paper is taken from two main sources. The first is a dataset from the
Colombian Inspectorate of Education. The Inspectorate provides freely downloadable micro-
level data on the centralized exam conducted among 2.7 million pupils in their last year of
secondary education (11th grade).11 This exam, known as SABER11, is a standardized test that
evaluates every year a range of seven school subjects.12 Test scores range from 0 to 100 in each
11This exam takes place every year in the month of September, three months prior to the official end of the
school calendar A.
12These subjects are: Math, Language, Physics, Biology, Chemistry, History, and Philosophy.
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subject and they are standardized by subject at the national level, so that each student’s score is
informative about his/her position relative to the national average in that subject. According to
the Inspectorate of Education, the tests are comparable for the period 2000-2013.
We use available data from 2007 to 2013 that include math and language scores; student and
school identifiers; some schools’ attributes such as the academic calendar, daily class sched-
ule, public or private status, specialization programs offered; and information on several in-
dividual characteristics such as age, gender, mother’s education, and other socio-demographic
indicators. We collapse these data at the school-year level, and focus only on our outcomes
of interest (i.e. math and language test scores) at several moments of the distribution: mean,
10th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 90th percentile of the schools’ test
scores. These scores are all standardized over the entire sample to interpret the effects in terms
of standard deviations (SD) at the school level. While representative of the student body that
is assessed at the last year of secondary school, this dataset does not collect information on
pupil’s retention at any stage of the education process.
To obtain retention rates at the school level we rely on the schools’ official census, which
the Ministry of Education releases each year for public use through the National Bureau of
Statistics (DANE, in Spanish). Known as the C-600 census, this dataset contains information
on academic indicators that all schools in the country are compelled to report on a yearly basis.
We use information from this dataset on retention rates at 10th grade, as well as other school
characteristics, such as the number of groups per grade, the number of students enrolled at
10th grade, the number of teachers with a professional degree, the number of teachers hired
under the old and new pay scales regulated by the central government, and the number of
non-academic staff (managerial, support, health) per school. We use this universal census
information for the period 2005-2012. Using unique school identifiers, we are able to match
88.2% of all schools’ test scores to the respective school retention data for the entire period
2007-2013. These matched data correspond to 85.6% (N=2,363,997) of all students that took
the exam during the same period.
Our unit of observation is a school-exam year combination. The estimation sample con-
sists of first-time SABER 11 test takers13 from schools that i) offered education exclusively in
Calendar A (February to November), ii) did not change this calendar during the period 2007-
2013, iii) had no missing values on tests scores, retention rates, and schools’ covariates, and
iv) reported information on retention rates for at least 3 years, with at least one year before and
after the retention law changed. The resulting dataset consist of an unbalanced panel of 6,248
schools, which in total across the 2007-2013 period contains 35,693 observations.
13We leave out of the sample the top 1% and bottom 1% of students in terms of their age reported at the exam.
This selection criterion excludes extreme outliers who reported ages below 12 or above 40.
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B. Common Trends
Figure 2 in panels (a) and (b) shows the average test scores across time for treated and control
schools in math and language, respectively. On average, control schools performed better at
both subjects during the AUP regime. For instance, students in control schools scored 0.1 of a
standard deviation more in the math exam than students enrolled in treated schools. The same
patterns are observed in the language exam with students scoring around 0.12 of a standard
deviation higher than students in treated schools. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the same results
when we plot the residuals from a regression including exam-year and school fixed effects, as
well as time-variant school attributes. Figure 3 reveals that such trends are also common when
distinguishing the treatment groups for high, middle, and low treated schools. These results
remain robust to the inclusion of school-specific covariates (Appendix Figure A.2).
The main conclusion from these graphs is that there is a common trend in test scores be-
tween treated and control schools. This allows us to use a difference-in-differences strategy.
The difference-in-differences estimator will isolate time invariant confounding factors, leaving
the remaining variation to be attributed to the effect of increasing retention in schools. In the
results section, we will provide robust statistical evidence that the common trend assumption
holds.
C. Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample used to estimate our main results. We present
information on schools’ characteristics during the AUP regime. Columns (1) and (3) report the
number of schools per treatment status, and columns (2) and (4) present the averages of each
control variable for both treated and control groups, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) report
differences in means and standard errors between treated and control schools.
Schools differ systematically in their attributes during the AUP regime. Considering socio-
demographic attributes of students, control schools present a more favorable composition of
students from highly educated households (measured as the proportion of mothers with tertiary
education), and few students with poverty status. There is also a larger proportion of public
schools in this group, relative to the treatment group. However, treated schools operate under
shorter working spells relative to schools in the control group. Moreover, treated schools also
seem to present some academic differentiation as they also provide other types of training (e.g.
pedagogical, technical vocational training).
With regards to school-related characteristics, treated schools, on average, have more groups
per grade and more qualified teachers employed at school. Regarding teachers’ compensation
and renewal of personnel, we observe that treated schools hire slightly more staff under the
new pay scale than control schools, but the overall proportion of teachers under the new pay
scale had increased during the last three years of the AUP regime for all schools. In con-
trast, control schools seem to employ more health professionals (e.g. dentists, physicians) than
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treated schools. Conversely, treated schools seem to hire more staff for managerial purposes
than control schools.
While time-invariant differences between treated and control schools are controlled for by
the inclusion of school-specific fixed effects, a potential concern for the identification strategy
implemented in this paper is that time-varying school’s attributes change at the same time
the policy intervention does. To address this issue, in some specifications we include school-
specific, time-varying attributes one and two years prior the exam date. As we will elaborate
further in our results section, our estimates remain invariant to the inclusion of these controls,
suggesting that we identify the effect of retention, net of other elements affecting test scores
across time.
V. Results
A. The Effect of the FRP Regime on Schools’ Test Scores
Table 2 presents our baseline estimates on the effects of higher retention due to the law change
on average math and language standardized test scores. As implied by equation (1), in some
specifications we include a set of time variant school-specific attributes to obtain the net impact
of the FRP regime. All standard errors are clustered at the school level to ensure we account
for potential serial correlation, as indicated in the difference-in-differences literature (Bertrand
et al., 2004).
Our findings show that, across all years, the increase in retention does not have a meaningful
economic effect on average math school performance. In contrast, we obtain a positive and
strongly significant effect on language scores of 6.5% of a SD for a consecutive 2-year prior
exposure to the FRP regime, and an average negative effect of 5.5% of a SD (Columns (4)-(5),
first row) for being exposed to higher retention rates one year before the exam is taken. As
treated schools increased retention 9 percentage points more than control schools, the effect
implies an increase in language scores of 7% of a SD for a 10 percentage point rise in retention
rates at 10th grade.
A plausible explanation for the positive effect attributed to retained students is that repeat-
ing a grade allows them to get a more thorough understanding of the material. Conversely,
there may be several reasons for the negative effect on the non-retained students. First, the
positive selection effect may be dominated by the negative influence of being in a group with
a large fraction of lower performing peers after retention rates increased. Secondly, it may
be that students started to allocate strategically more time and effort to study stem subjects
when retention rates increased. Decreasing marginal productivity in both subjects implies that
math scores do not increase as much as language scores decrease. This latter effect might be
particularly relevant for students at the margin of repeating a grade.
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B. Differences Between Retained and Non-Retained Students
To provide further evidence on these effects, we use individual level data on the age of the
students to classify them as retained or non-retained. In the Colombian educational system, the
nominal age of graduation is 17 years. Differences in age at the exam date can be explained
mostly by having experienced grade retention (not necessarily at 10th grade only). Hence, we
label students as “non-retained” if at the date of the exam they are 17 years old or younger. In
contrast, we label students as “potentially retained” if they are 18 years old or older.14 Then,
we collapse the student and school datasets to create a unbalanced panel where the unit of
observation is a school-exam year-retention status combination.15 We estimate the baseline
specification for both samples separately.
Table 3 presents our findings from the above exercise. Increased retention rates do not have
any strongly significant impact on math scores for both types of students (columns (1)-(4)). For
language scores the conclusions are different. In particular, while outcomes for non-retained
students are still unaffected, potentially retained students’ scores are affected. Estimates in
columns (5) and (6) imply that being exposed to higher retention rates under the FRP regime
one year (two years) before the exam causes a reduction (increase) of 5% (6%) of a SD on
language scores. In general, this evidence supports the notion that i) the effect captured by the
two-year prior exposure can be fully attributed to retained students and measures the impact
of increased retention on test scores and, ii) the one-year prior exposure coefficient accounts
for the effect of increased retention on marginal students that should have been retained but
managed to “survive” the higher retention rates in the FRP regime.
C. On the Non-Linear Effects of Grade Retention
Table 4 documents the effects using the baseline specification implied by equation (1) with
three dummy variables for all treatment groups of interest, i.e., low, middle and highly treated
schools. In line with our basic specification, results from columns (1)-(2) suggest no significant
effects of being exposed to the FRP period in years t− 1 and t− 2 on average math scores at
year t. In contrast, we obtain significant effects for average language test scores which vary
depending on the school’s treatment classification (columns (3)-(4)).
Coefficients displayed in the first, third, and fifth rows suggest that middle treated schools
score 13% of a SD lower relative to control schools because of a 6 percentage point rise in
retention. The effects for all other treatment groups, even those not statistically significant,
suggest a non-linear quadratic pattern. As all coefficients displayed have a negative sign, we
believe there are confounding factors that are positively correlated with the probability of re-
peating a grade. These factors are masking the true detrimental impact of increased retention
14In Colombia, individuals are legally considered as adults if they are 18 years old or older.
15This process leads to have two different datasets. A dataset from non-retained students comprising of 35,103
observations corresponding to 6,235 schools, and a second dataset with information on potentially retained stu-
dents with 34,534 observations from 6,237 schools.
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on marginal students, especially of those enrolled in schools that retain at nearly optimal lev-
els. By using the difference-in-differences estimator, we isolate the true effects from the bias
attributed to such unobserved variation.
The increase in language scores of the retained students is significant both for the middle
and highly treated groups. Interestingly, the gains on test scores appear to be similar for these
groups. Dividing these results by the percentage points jump in retention rates corresponding
to each group implies that the ATT coefficient of the highly treated group is smaller than that of
the medium treated group. Considering that highly treated schools experienced a 12 percentage
point increase in retention because of the FRP regime, our findings imply that a one percentage
point rise in retention rates at 10th grade explains a 1.08% of a SD increase in test scores. The
aforementioned impacts are larger for schools in the “medium treated” group. Namely, a 6
percentage points increase in retention rates at year t− 2 implies a rise in test scores of about
13% of a SD in year t, so the effect is around 2.16% of a SD per one percentage point jump in
retention. Hence, the same percentage point change in middle treated schools is two times as
effective as it is in highly treated schools.
Our estimates suggest that retaining students is a strategy that exhibits decreasing marginal
returns because there is a non-linear effect on language scores. At some point, higher retention
is not expected to increase language performance. These students may, for instance, become
demotivated because they must take the same classes again. For the marginal students, the
results are only highly significant for the middle treated group which also shows the non-linear
nature of the effects obtained.
The main conclusion from these findings is that there is a non-linear effect of retention,
as schools that actively retain students do not necessarily benefit more from such a strategy,
relative to other schools promoting more students. For the same percentage point increase
in retention, middle treated schools obtain larger gains relative to schools that retain more
students.
D. Effects along the Test Scores’ Distribution
In Figure 4 we plot our difference-in-differences coefficients, this time considering test scores’
percentiles by school as dependent variables, and using the above-median change in retention
as the treatment classification criteria. In all these estimations we include school-specific co-
variates, although results barely change when the latter are excluded.
For math scores, we again obtain no effects for retained and marginal students across the
entire test score distribution. On the contrary, results on language scores attributed to marginal
pupils displayed in panel (c) show that the negative effect discussed earlier is strongest at the
lower end of the distribution. For example, students performing at the 25th percentile in treated
schools score up to 7% of a SD lower than comparable students at control schools. As average
language scores for all students in the upper segment of the distribution were not affected by
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retention, these findings suggest that the negative effect of being exposed to higher retention is
more severe for lower performing but still non-retained students. We conjecture that this effect
can be explained by the fact that students at the bottom of the ability distribution faced a higher
threat of retention under the FRP regime, therefore compromising their test scores in the future.
Regarding language scores of retained students, the effect of higher retention is decreasing
in students’ test performance. Relative to students at the 10th percentile, students in treated
schools scored 11% of a SD higher because of the FRP Regime. The effect is still significant
but reduces in magnitude as performance increases. For instance, students in the 25th percentile
score 8% of a SD more than students with comparable performance at control schools. The
FRP regime appears to have no effect for those students performing at the median or above.
Overall, these findings suggest that pupils at the lower end of the distribution benefited more
from being in schools with increased retention rates due to repeating their coursework. This
may also indicate that the benefits of retention are not linear. That is, being retained can be
highly beneficial for underperforming students.
We perform the above exercise also for the specification in which we classify three treat-
ment groups as already discussed. Table 5 presents the corresponding difference-in-differences
coefficients for math and language scores. The table shows the results across the test scores’
distributions distinguishing between low, medium and high treated schools. For math scores
we obtain positive impacts at the upper end of the distribution that can be attributed to marginal
students, although these effects are only significant at the 10% level. We do observe a signif-
icant negative effect for retained students on math scores of nine percent of a SD, suggesting
that retained students’ performance at the top of the distribution might be compromised as re-
tention increases. In contrast, the positive effects on language scores for retained students, and
the negative effects for the marginal students, are mostly relevant for middle treated schools.
These effects are smaller in magnitude for the high treated group. This result supports our
conjecture about the non-linear nature of the retention effects on test scores.
Several conclusions can be obtained from the estimates presented in this section. First,
higher retention does not affect math scores, neither at the average nor at any below-median
percentiles of the distribution. Second, higher retention positively (negatively) affects language
scores for retained students (marginal students). Third, the fact that the results are stronger for
middle treated schools suggests that the effect of retention is non-linear, as these schools obtain
larger returns for the same percentage point increase in retention. Higher retention at some
point no longer leads to higher scores for the retained students or lower scores for the students at
the margin of repeating 10th grade. This also shows that our results are not driven by alternative
reasons, such as selection. Finally, results obtained for both retained and marginal students are
strongest at the lower end of the test score distribution. This indicates that low ability, retained
students might benefit more from increased retention due to repeating classes or because the
stigma of retention becomes of lower importance. Marginal students with similar ability score
lower because they might face a higher threat of being retained, underperforming at the test
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later on.
E. Testing the Common Trend Assumption
In this subsection, we present several robustness checks that support the empirical strategy
implemented in this study. Table 6 presents difference-in-differences estimates of the common
trends specification implied by equation (2), using exam year 2007 as a baseline. Appendix
Table A.1 reports the same analysis for higher, middle, and low treated schools. In both tables
we report the F-statistics of the joint test that the AUP-period coefficients are not statistically
different from zero. As our estimates suggest, we can conclude that treated and control schools
share a common trend that do not determine tests scores during the FRP regime. Regarding
the placebo tests implied by equation (3), Table 7 report difference-in-differences coefficients
assuming the FRP regime started in 2008 (Columns (1)-(4)) or 2007 (Columns (5)-(8)). The
same estimates considering highly, middle, and low treated schools are reported in Appendix
Table A.2. As the F-statistics indicate, we do not find evidence showing that pre-existing trends
have a direct impact on the variation in test scores we observe after the retention policy changed.
Finally, we perform a falsification test using the subsample of control schools. From
roughly 3000 schools in the control group, we select at random 1500 schools and assign them
to the treatment group. Then, we estimate the model implied by our baseline specification (1).
If we replicate this process say, 1000 times, we should expect to obtain significant results in
no more than 50 replications using a 95% confidence level. Otherwise, results from this ex-
ercise will cast doubts on our treatment-control classification. Figure 5 displays the absolute
t-statistic of each of these replications for our coefficients of interest, where the vertical red line
denotes the 5% critical value of a t-student distribution (i.e. 1.96). We also present in Appendix
Table A.3 the summary statistics of all parameters recovered from this falsification test. As ob-
served, less than 5% of the replications turn out to be significant as only up to 28 replications
are statistically different from zero. In addition, all mean coefficients are virtually zero, with
standard errors at least 27 times higher than the reported effect. Overall, these results support
the treatment-control categorization used in this paper.
F. Additional Robustness Checks
As indicated in the data section, there is attrition in our data for schools in which either retention
rates or pre-FRP regime’s characteristics are not completely observed throughout the period of
interest. To analyze whether this attrition is selective, we report estimates in Table 9 using only
schools from the seven-years balanced panel. As expected, attrition increases dramatically,
leaving only 3,281 schools left to consider in the estimation. However, we observe that the signs
of our estimates do not change. The effects become strongly significant and slightly higher
in magnitude, giving strong support to our baseline findings. In fact, given the magnitudes
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obtained from this robustness check, we can consider the coefficients provided in our baseline
results as lower bound estimate of the true effect of the FRP regime on test scores.
Another concern in our empirical strategy is the timing between the announcement of the
policy change and the time the new regime was officially in place. As discussed before, schools
were informed in 2009 that from 2010 onwards they will be allowed to retain as many students
as they prefer. It is plausible then that some schools reacted to this announcement by increasing
retention rates in 2009. To check whether our results are robust to this behavior we repeat the
estimations of our baseline specification, but excluding observations from exam year 2010.
Table 10 reports difference-in-differences coefficients from this exercise. All coefficients are
virtually the same as we obtain in our central findings, suggesting that schools’ incentives to
anticipate the policy change are not the main source of variation driving the effects we are
documenting in this paper.
VI. Potential Mechanisms
In this section we explore propagation channels that may drive the effects we obtain. As im-
plied by the FRP regime, treated schools significantly increased their retention rates, relative
to schools in the control group. Are there any school characteristics that induce some institu-
tions to retain more students? Are some school attributes amplifying the impacts of increased
retention? To answer these questions, we assess the extent to which average class size at 10th
grade, teachers’ qualifications, and changes in the way teachers are remunerated play a role in
disseminating the effects of grade retention.
There is a large consensus in the economics of education literature about the negative effects
of large class sizes on students’ academic performance (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Fredriksson
et al., 2012). Nonetheless, to our knowledge there is no discussion on whether grade retention
and class size at school exhibit some complementarities. Assuming everything else constant,
increased retention may have a positive impact on class size. We can also reverse the direction
of the relationship. Schools with more students per group might have fewer incentives to retain
students as large classrooms are more difficult to manage. Hence, we might expect the positive
(negative) effects of retention to be weaker (stronger) on retained (marginal) students as the
number of pupils per group rises.
Regarding our second transmission channel, recent papers highlight the empirical chal-
lenges of identifying the effects of teacher quality in the classroom (Rivkin et al., 2005; Gerrit-
sen et al., 2017). We may expect the benefits (costs) of retention to be amplified (reduced) as
teachers’ education improves.
We exploit a regulation change in the way public school teachers are remunerated. From
2002 onwards, under Decree 1278, the remuneration, probation period, and screening process
for newly hired teachers changed substantially. Under the new system, prospective teachers
need to participate in a public entry contest which, after completion, will determine their start-
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ing rank and wage. In addition, teachers hired under this new scheme will be subject to a
probation period up to 12 months, to then receive tenure that can be revoked if subsequent
performance evaluations are not satisfactory. In contrast, teachers hired before June 2002 were
subject to the old 1979’s, more lenient regulation (Decree 2277). This innovation in the em-
ployment relationship of teachers created a mixture of academic staff paid with the old and new
pay scales. As it is expected that newly hired teachers will replace those about to retire, the pro-
portion of teachers under the new pay scale at school is a key amplifying mechanism to study.
Likewise, the direction of the effect is unclear. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence
suggesting that teachers under the new regulation are positively selected, implying positive but
moderate effects on school performance (Brutti and Sa´nchez, 2017). On the other hand, newly
hired teachers may be inexperienced on identifying students with different educational needs.
As career concerns are prevalent in their probation period, teachers might have incentives to
focus their effort on students that are more likely to succeed. Thus, increasing participation of
teachers under the new pay scale might have detrimental effects on students, especially those
at the lower end of the ability distribution.
To test these mechanisms, we modify our baseline specification as follows:
Yst = αs+δt +
2
∑
h=1
γh[Treateds×FRPt−h]+
2
∑
h=1
βhAttributet−h
+
2
∑
h=1
ρh[Treateds×FRPt−h×Attributet−h]+ εst , (4)
where the variable Attributet−h denotes each mechanism we intend to test, one and two years
before the exam takes place. The coefficients of interest in this specification are ρ1 and ρ2,
which measure how each attribute in question propagates the effects of increased retention for
marginal and retained students, respectively. We present our findings from this analysis in
Table 11. Panel A reports the difference-in-differences coefficients. Panels B, C, and D show
estimates on the interaction of the difference-in-differences effects with average school’s class
size at 10th grade, the proportion of teachers with a post-secondary education degree, and the
proportion of teachers under the new, government regulated pay scale, respectively.
As observed in Columns (1)-(3) none of the mechanisms considered is masking the null
effect of grade retention on math scores. We obtain a marginally significant effect of class
size for retained students, but we claim that this can be ignored as it is only significant at the
10% level and very small in magnitude. In contrast, results for language scores indicate two
propagation mechanisms worth to be discussed. First, we observe a negative effect of increased
teachers’ qualifications on test scores, as both coefficients of interest exhibit a negative sign.
However, it seems that the effect in question is relevant (at the 10% significance level) only for
retained students. These findings support the idea that policy interventions aimed to foster the
human capital acquisiton of teachers may not be as effective as other measures to extract the
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largest gains from grade retention.
Second, we observe the teachers’ composition at treated schools to play a key role in prop-
agating the effects of increased retention. In particular, a 10% jump in the proportion of newly
hired teachers implies a rise (drop) in language scores of 2.5% (3.6%) of a SD for retained
(marginally non-retained) students. To present these effects in more detail, in Figure 6 we plot
the marginal effects of a 10 percentage points increment in the proportion of teachers hired
under the new pay scale, one and two years before the exam takes place (panels (a) and (b),
respectively). As observed, it is clear that benefits and costs of increased retention for language
scores are monotonically increasing. This fact suggests that retained students benefit more from
a young academic workforce that is willing to invest time and effort in their education, while
marginally non-retained students are harmed since inexperienced teachers may be unable to
target them accordingly.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the effect of retention in 10th grade on school performance in grade 11. We
exploit a law change in Colombia with respect to retention. Until 2010, schools were allowed
to retain a maximum of 5 percent of their total number of students. After the abolishment of the
law in 2010, schools were free to retain as many students as they considered appropriate. This
led to a large increase in retention, with considerable heterogeneity across schools. We use a
difference-in-differences analysis to study the effect of retention on test performance. Placebo
tests suggest that there are common trends in scores among schools that responded in various
degrees to the law change.
Our estimates reveal that there are positive effects of more retention on language test per-
formance for retained students. These effects are non-linear, as modest increases in retention
have positive effects but larger increases in retention do not necessarily lead to better perfor-
mance. In addition, our findings suggest that non-retained students at the lower end of the
ability distribution perform worse in language tests. Potential explanations for this effect in-
clude the negative spillover impacts from formerly retained students, the strategic substitution
of effort between stem and non-stem subjects in order to avoid grade retention, and the changes
in teachers’ workforce composition. We provide evidence of the latter channel, with career
concerned, inexperienced teachers failing to identify students at the margin of being retained as
the main transmission mechanism. In contrast, we do not find any effects on math scores that
can be attributed either to retained or non-retained pupils.
This research shows the importance of analyzing effects of retention at different margins
of the ability distribution. Although data restrictions do not allow to recover information on
individual retention, we feel confident that the empirical strategy and data construction im-
plemented in this paper aids to solve this limitation by decomposing the effect of retention
among different types of students. More research is needed to investigate whether the gains of
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retention we identify can be outweighed by other costs of retention, such as school dropouts,
career choice regret, delayed (or sudden) labor market participation, forgone income, and the
formation of undesirable personality traits, preferences and risk attitudes across the life cycle.
References
Angrist, J. D. and V. Lavy (1999). Using maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of class size
on scholastic achievement. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 533–575.
Bauernschuster, S., T. Hener, and H. Rainer (2016). Children of a (policy) revolution: The
introduction of universal child care and its effect on fertility. Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 14(4), 975–1005.
Belot, M. and V. Vandenberghe (2014). Evaluating the ”threat” effects of grade repetition:
Exploiting the 2001 reform by the french-speaking community of Belgium. Education Eco-
nomics 22(1), 73–89.
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004). How much should we trust Differences-
in-Differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1), 249–275.
Brutti, Z. and F. Sa´nchez (2017). Does better teacher selection lead to better students? evidence
from a large scale reform in colombia. Documento de trabajo CEDE (11).
Eide, E. R. and M. H. Showalter (2001). The effect of grade retention on educational and labor
market outcomes. Economics of Education Review 20(6), 563–576.
Fredriksson, P., B. O¨ckert, and H. Oosterbeek (2012). Long-term effects of class size. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(1), 249–285.
Fruehwirth, J. C., S. Navarro, and Y. Takahashi (2016). How the timing of grade retention
affects outcomes: Identification and estimation of time-varying treatment effects. Journal of
Labor Economics 34(4), 979–1021.
Garcı´a-Pe´rez, J. I., M. Hidalgo-Hidalgo, and J. A. Robles-Zurita (2014). Does grade retention
affect students’ achievement? some evidence from spain. Applied Economics 46(12), 1373–
1392.
Gerritsen, S., E. Plug, and D. Webbink (2017). Teacher quality and student achievement:
Evidence from a sample of dutch twins. Journal of Applied Econometrics 32(3), 643–660.
Havnes, T. and M. Mogstad (2011). Money for nothing? Universal child care and maternal
employment. Journal of Public Economics 95(11), 1455–1465.
22
Hill, A. J. (2014). The costs of failure: Negative externalities in high school course repetition.
Economics of Education Review 43, 91–105.
Iregui, A. M., L. Melo, and J. Ramos (2006). La educacio´n en colombia: Ana´lisis del marco
normativo y de los indicadores sectoriales. Revista de Economı´a del Rosario 9(2), 175–238.
Jacob, B. A. and L. Lefgren (2004). Remedial education and student achievement: A
Regression-Discontinuity analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1), 226–244.
Jacob, B. A. and L. Lefgren (2009). The effect of grade retention on high school completion.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(3), 33–58.
Jimerson, S., E. Carlson, M. Rotert, B. Egeland, and L. A. Sroufe (1997). A prospective,
longitudinal study of the correlates and consequences of early grade retention. Journal of
School Psychology 35(1), 3–25.
Jimerson, S. R. (1999). On the failure of failure: Examining the association between early
grade retention and education and employment outcomes during late adolescence. Journal
of School Psychology 37(3), 243–272.
Koppensteiner, M. F. (2014). Automatic grade promotion and student performance: Evidence
from Brazil. Journal of Development Economics 107, 277–290.
Mahjoub, M.-B. (2017). The treatment effect of grade repetitions. Education Economics 25(4),
418–432.
Manacorda, M. (2012). The cost of grade retention. Review of Economics and Statistics 94(2),
596–606.
Martı´nez, G. and B. Herrera (2002). Finalidades y alcances del decreto 230 del 11 de febrero
de 2002. Ministerio de Educacio´n Nacional. Bogota´, 89–90.
McCoy, A. R. and A. J. Reynolds (1999). Grade retention and school performance:: An ex-
tended investigation. Journal of School Psychology 37(3), 273–298.
Namen, O. (2017). Does encouraging social promotion affect educational outcomes? Mimeo,
Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago.
Pinzo´n, D. (2018). Reprobacio´n y desempen˜o acade´mico: Evidencia de la implementacio´n
de la promocio´n automa´tica en colombia. Documento CEDE 016198, Universidad de los
Andes, CEDE.
Rivkin, S. G., E. A. Hanushek, and J. F. Kain (2005). Teachers, schools, and academic achieve-
ment. Econometrica 73(2), 417–458.
23
Silberglitt, B., J. J. Appleton, M. K. Burns, and S. R. Jimerson (2006). Examining the effects
of grade retention on student reading performance: A longitudinal study. Journal of School
Psychology 44(4), 255–270.
Stearns, E., S. Moller, J. Blau, and S. Potochnick (2007). Staying back and dropping out:
The relationship between grade retention and school dropout. Sociology of Education 80(3),
210–240.
24
VIII. Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Retention Rates per Treatment Status
(a) Control vs. Treated Schools
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Notes: Panel (a) displays retention rates at 10th grade (in percentage points) for treated and
control schools. Treatment schools are defined as those with above -median increase in their
retention rates at 10th grade from the automatic promotion years to the free retention years.
Control schools are defined as those with below-median increase. Panel (b) shows retention
rates at 10th grade for control and treated schools, for the different treatment definitions ex-
plained in the main text: Highly Treated (HighTreateds), Medium Treated (MiddleTreateds),
and Low Treated (LowTreateds). The dashed vertical line denotes year 2009 where schools
were notified that the AUP regime will no longer hold. The gray area denotes the years where
the FRP regime was in place.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Schools’ Characteristics during AUP Regime
Treated Control Both
# Schools Mean # Schools Mean Difference s.e.
Average characteristics during AUP years (2007-2009) (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(4)
Socio-Demographic School’s Composition
Proportion of female students 3,142 0.528 3,106 0.527 0.001 0.004
Proportion of students from rural areas 3,142 0.342 3,106 0.328 0.014 0.010
Proportion of students from ethnic minorities 3,142 0.078 3,106 0.080 -0.002 0.005
Average age at exam date 3,142 17.628 3,106 17.598 0.030* 0.016
Proportion of students with an educated mother 3,142 0.149 3,106 0.224 -0.075*** 0.006
Proportion of students above poverty classification 3,142 0.253 3,106 0.343 -0.090*** 0.008
Public school 3,142 0.272 3,106 0.388 -0.117*** 0.012
Working spell: 7:00 to 12:00 3,142 0.558 3,106 0.502 0.056*** 0.012
Working spell: 13:00 to 18:00 3,142 0.170 3,106 0.110 0.061*** 0.008
School type: academic and technical 3,142 0.625 3,106 0.644 -0.019 0.012
School type: pedagogical training 3,142 0.154 3,106 0.128 0.026*** 0.009
School type: technical 3,142 0.020 3,106 0.014 0.006* 0.003
School-Related Attributes
Average class size 3,142 0.201 3,106 0.214 -0.013 0.010
Average number of groups at 10th grade 3,142 32.272 3,106 29.491 2.781*** 0.302
# of teachers with qualifications 3,142 2.367 3,106 1.839 0.528*** 0.047
Proportion of teachers under the new pay scale 3,142 0.913 3,106 0.881 0.032*** 0.003
Average number of managerial personnel 3,142 0.159 3,106 0.129 0.030*** 0.005
Average number of support staff 3,142 3.204 3,106 2.837 0.367*** 0.049
Average number of health personnel 3,142 0.768 3,106 0.806 -0.038 0.029
3,142 0.166 3,106 0.239 -0.072*** 0.015
Total Schools 6248
Notes: Data on socio-demographic composition of schools comes from the ICFES SABER11 dataset. Data on schools’ attributes come from the
administrative records of the C600 school made by the national statistics office (DANE). Treated and control schools are defined as in the text.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Figure 2: Test Scores by Treatment Status
(a) Math Scores
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(b) Language Scores
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Notes: This figure displays average tests scores in year (t +1), for AUP and FRP years. Panel
(a) presents common trends on average math scores between treated (dashed lines) and control
(solid lines) schools. Panel (b) shows similar trends on average language test scores.
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Figure 3: Test Scores by Treatment Status - Multiple Treatment Groups
(a) Math (Highly Treated)
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(b) Math (Medium Treated)
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(c) Math (Low Treated)
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(d) Language (Highly Treated)
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(e) Language (Medium Treated)
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(f) Language (Low Treated)
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Notes: This figure displays average test scores at year (t + 1) in the AUP and FRP years for the multiple treatment groups described in the text.
Panels (a)-(c) show average math scores for controls schools (solid lines) and highly treated (HighTreateds) medium treated (MiddleTreateds) and
low treated (LowTreateds) schools. Panels (d)-(f) present the same figures for average language scores. The dashed vertical line denotes year 2009
where schools were notified that the AUP regime will no longer hold. The gray area denotes the years where the FRP regime was in place.
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Table 2: Effect of the FRP Regime on Average Test Scores
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Treateds×FRPt−1 0.003 0.015 -0.061** -0.051*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
Treateds×FRPt−2 0.002 0.006 0.064*** 0.066***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.149 0.155 0.094 0.101
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. All speci-
fications include fixed effects by school and exam year. Treated (Control) schools are defined
as those with above median (below median) increase in their retention rates at 10th grade from
the AUP years to the FRP years. The outcome variables are average standardized SABER11
test scores for math and language subjects at year t. The coefficients of interest are the inter-
action of an indicator of treatment status with a set of dummy variables FRPt−1 and FRPt−2,
measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years before the SABER11 exam is
taken, respectively. Covariates considered in these estimations include the first two lags of:
Average class size at 10th grade, number of health, support, and managerial (non-academic)
staff per school, number of teachers with a professional degree, number of teachers under the
new and old government-regulated pay scales, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale,
and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Table 3: Effects of the FRP Regime on SABER11 Test Scores by Plausible Retention Status
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treateds×FRPt−1 0.002 0.006 0.017 0.023* -0.049** -0.044** -0.005 0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Treateds×FRPt−2 -0.010 -0.009 0.002 0.005 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.015 0.016
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 34,534 34,534 35,103 35,103 34,534 34,534 35,103 35,103
R-squared 0.039 0.041 0.128 0.132 0.050 0.053 0.069 0.073
# Schools 6,237 6,237 6,235 6,235 6,237 6,237 6,235 6,235
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Potentially Retained Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. This table presents difference-in-differences estimates by
partitioning the sample between potentially retained (aged 18 years or older) and non-retained (aged 17 years or younger). All specifications
include fixed effects by school and exam year. Treated (Control) schools are defined as those with above median (below median) increase in
their retention rates at 10th grade from the AUP years to the FRP years. The outcome variables are average standardized SABER11 test scores
for math and language subjects at year t. The coefficients of interest are the interaction of an indicator of treatment status with a set of dummy
variables FRPt−1 and FRPt−2, measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years before the SABER11 exam is taken, respectively.
Covariates considered in these estimations include the first two lags of: Average class size at 10th grade, number of health, support, and managerial
non-academic staff per school, number of teachers with a professional degree, number of teachers under the new and old government-regulated
pay scales, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale, and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Table 4: Effect of the FRP Regime on Average Test Scores Per Multiple Treatment Status
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (4) (5)
HighTreateds×FRPt−1 0.037 0.053 -0.093** -0.081*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.042)
HighTreateds×FRPt−2 -0.007 -0.003 0.124*** 0.127***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037)
MiddleTreateds×FRPt−1 -0.015 -0.003 -0.138*** -0.127***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.043)
MiddleTreateds×FRPt−2 -0.017 -0.013 0.127*** 0.128***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.037)
LowTreateds×FRPt−1 0.020 0.027 -0.077* -0.072
(0.033) (0.032) (0.046) (0.045)
LowTreateds×FRPt−2 -0.014 -0.012 0.061 0.062
(0.030) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.149 0.156 0.095 0.102
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. Treated
schools are defined as in the main text. The outcome variables are average standardized
SABER11 test scores for math and language subjects at year t. The coefficients of interest
are the interaction of an indicator of treatment status with a set of dummy variables FRPt−1 and
FRPt−2, measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years before the SABER11
exam is taken, respectively. Covariates considered in these estimations include the first two lags
of: Average class size at 10th grade, number of health, support, and managerial non-academic
staff per school, number of teachers with a professional degree, number of teachers under the
new and old government-regulated pay scales, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale,
and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Figure 4: Effect of the FRP Regime on SABER11 Test Scores’ Distribution
(a) 1-year prior exposure (Math Scores)
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Notes: This figure displays the difference-in-differences effect of the FRP regime on the percentiles of the SABER11 test scores’ distribution for
both math and language subjects. Panels (a)-(b) present the effect of one and two years prior exposure to the FRP regime for math scores. Panels
(c)-(d) plots the same effects for language scores. The caps denote confidence intervals at the 95% significance level.
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Table 5: Effect of the FRP Regime on SABER11 Test Scores’ Distribution by Multiple Treatment Status
Math Scores Language Scores
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
HighTreateds×FRPt−1 0.060 0.039 0.022 0.069* 0.082* -0.075 -0.087* -0.095** -0.049 -0.046
(0.045) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.045) (0.063) (0.051) (0.045) (0.046) (0.053)
HighTreateds×FRPt−2 0.000 0.012 0.011 -0.006 -0.032 0.140** 0.118** 0.132*** 0.095** 0.096*
(0.044) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.046) (0.059) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051)
MiddleTreateds×FRPt−1 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.007 0.056 -0.153** -0.152*** -0.119*** -0.060 -0.089*
(0.045) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.064) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046) (0.054)
MiddleTreateds×FRPt−2 0.016 0.015 -0.000 -0.013 -0.093** 0.187*** 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.074* 0.091*
(0.044) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.046) (0.060) (0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051)
LowTreateds×FRPt−1 0.037 0.020 0.028 0.025 0.050 -0.061 -0.044 -0.085* -0.046 -0.112**
(0.046) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.046) (0.065) (0.054) (0.047) (0.048) (0.055)
LowTreateds×FRPt−2 -0.001 -0.003 -0.019 -0.009 -0.032 0.089 0.019 0.074* 0.050 0.090*
(0.046) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.048) (0.061) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043) (0.052)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.022 0.052 0.127 0.223 0.253 0.270 0.163 0.075 0.174 0.299
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. All specifications include fixed effects by school and exam year.
Treated schools are defined as in the main text. The outcome variables are schools’ different percentiles of the standardized SABER11 test scores
for math and language subjects at year t. The coefficients of interest are the interaction of an indicator of treatment status with a set of dummy
variables FRPt−1 and FRPt−2, measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years before the SABER11 exam is taken, respectively.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Table 6: Common Trends Assumption Test
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-FRP trends
Treateds×1[year=2008] 0.011 0.017 0.025 0.029
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Treateds×1[year=2009] -0.021 -0.013 0.030 0.036*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Treateds×1[year=2010] -0.050** -0.038 0.008 0.015
(0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020)
FRP trends
Treateds×1[year=2011] -0.014 0.004 -0.045 -0.031
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Treateds×1[year=2012] -0.017 0.004 0.021 0.037*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
Treateds×1[year=2013] -0.005 0.018 0.016 0.033*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.149 0.155 0.094 0.101
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates No Yes No Yes
F-stat (3; 6,248) 2.541 2.043 1.087 1.368
p-value 0.0546 0.106 0.353 0.251
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. This
table shows results for the common trend assumption test. The outcome variables are average
standardized test scores for math and language subjects measured for year t. Covariates include
the first two lags of: average class size at 10th grade, average managerial, health, and support
staff per school, average number of teachers under the old and new pay scales, average number
of teachers with a professional degree, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale, and
proportion of teachers with a professional degree. F-statistics reported correspond to the null
hypothesis that pre-FRP regime trends differences between control and treated schools are not
statistically significant. Treated and controls schools are defined as in the main text.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05. * p-value < 0.1.
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Table 7: Placebo Tests: FRP Regime Started Before Original Date
Math Scores Language Scores Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treateds×FakeFRP2008,t−1 -0.026 -0.021 0.018 0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Treateds×FakeFRP2008,t−2 -0.001 0.009 -0.030 -0.023
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
Treateds×FakeFRP2007,t−1 0.011 0.018 0.024 0.028
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Treateds×FakeFRP2007,t−1 -0.032* -0.022 -0.018 -0.011
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.149 0.155 0.094 0.101 0.149 0.155 0.094 0.101
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-stats (2; 6,248) 1.390 0.692 1.290 0.972 1.520 0.817 0.960 1.233
p-value 0.249 0.500 0.275 0.378 0.219 0.442 0.383 0.291
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. All specifications include fixed effects by school and exam
year. Treated (Control) schools are defined as those with above median (below median) increase in their retention rates at 10th grade from the
AUP years to the FRP years. The dependent variables are average standardized math and language SABER11’s test scores. Columns (1)-(4) report
results on the placebo test assuming the FRP regime started in 2008. Columns (5)-(8) show estimates on the placebo test assuming the FRP regime
started in 2007. F-statistics reported correspond to the joint test of the null hypothesis that placebo effects are not different from zero. Covariates
include the first two lags of: average class size at 10th grade, average managerial, health, and support staff per school, average number of teachers
under the old and new pay scales, average number of teachers with a professional degree, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale, and
proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05. * p-value < 0.1.
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Figure 5: Falsification Test - 1500 Control Schools as Treated
(a) Math Scores - Absolute t-statistic
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(b) Language Scores - Absolute t-statistic
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Notes: Based on 1000 replications. This figure displays absolute t-statistics of the falsification test. We estimate the baseline specification (1)
using the control group sample only, but we randomly allocate the treatment status to 1500 control schools. All estimations include fixed effects
by school and exam year. The outcome variables are mean standardized SABER11 test scores for math and language subjects at year t. The
coefficients of interest are the interaction of an indicator of (false) treatment status with a set of dummy variables FRPt−1 and FRPt−2, measuring
the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years before the SABER11 exam is taken, respectively. The red vertical line denotes the critical value
by which the null hypothesis of non-significance is rejected at the 5% level.
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Table 8: Effect of the FRP Regime on Average Test Scores - Balanced Panel Estimations
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Treateds×FRPt−1 -0.021 -0.007 -0.091*** -0.079**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031)
Treateds×FRPt−2 0.019 0.024 0.076*** 0.079***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967
R-squared 0.176 0.184 0.117 0.126
# Schools 3,281 3,281 3,281 3,281
Covariates No yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. This table
reports difference-in-difference estimates when we consider only those schools from a balanced
panel dataset of seven years. All specifications include fixed effects by school and exam year.
Treated (Control) schools are defined as those with above median (below median) increase
in their retention rates at 10th grade from the AUP years to the FRP years. The outcome
variables are average standardized SABER11 test scores for math and language subjects at
year t. The coefficients of interest are the interaction of an indicator of treatment status with
a set of dummy variables FRPt−1 and FRPt−2, measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one
and two years before the SABER11 exam is taken, respectively. Covariates considered in these
estimations include the first two lags of: Average class size at 10th grade, number of health,
support, and managerial non-academic staff per school, number of teachers with a professional
degree, number of teachers under the new and old government-regulated pay scales, proportion
of teachers under the new pay scale, and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Table 9: Effect of the FRP Regime on Average Test Scores - Excluding Anticipatory Effects
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Treateds×FRPt−1 -0.012 0.002 -0.068** -0.056**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028)
Treateds×FRPt−2 0.006 0.010 0.066*** 0.068***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 30,576 30,576 30,576 30,576
R-squared 0.158 0.166 0.105 0.112
# Schools 6,234 6,234 6,234 6,234
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. This table
reports difference-in-differences regressions excluding observations from exam year 2010. All
specifications include fixed effects by school and exam year. Treated (Control) schools are
defined as those with above median (below median) increase in their retention rates at 10th
grade from the AUP years to the FRP years. The outcome variables are average standardized
SABER11 test scores for math and language subjects at year t. The coefficients of interest are
the interaction of an indicator of treatment status with a set of dummy variables FRPt−1 and
FRPt−2, measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years before the SABER11
exam is taken, respectively. Covariates considered in these estimations include the first two lags
of: Average class size at 10th grade, number of health, support, and managerial non-academic
staff per school, number of teachers with a professional degree, number of teachers under the
new and old government-regulated pay scales, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale,
and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Table 10: Effect of the FRP Regimen on SABER11 Test Scores: Mechanisms
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Difference in Differences Effect
DIDs,t−1 = Treateds×FRPt−1 0.006 0.073 0.015 -0.079** 0.063 0.036
(0.029) (0.067) (0.023) (0.036) (0.078) (0.031)
DIDs,t−2 = Treateds×FRPt−2 0.036 -0.006 0.002 0.051* 0.155*** 0.017
(0.027) (0.058) (0.021) (0.030) (0.056) (0.025)
Panel B: Effects by Class Size
DIDs,t−1× ClassSizes,t−1 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
DIDs,t−2× ClassSizes,t−2 -0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Panel C: Effects by Teacher’s Qualifications
DIDs,t−1× TeachersQuals,t−1 -0.064 -0.125
(0.068) (0.077)
DIDs,t−2× TeachersQuals,t−2 0.015 -0.093*
(0.058) (0.054)
Panel D: Effects by Teacher’s Pay Scale
DIDs,t−1× TeachersNewpays,t−1 0.001 -0.365***
(0.054) (0.060)
DIDs,t−2× TeachersNewpays,t−2 0.015 0.249***
(0.047) (0.050)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.101 0.102 0.104
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level reported in parentheses. This table presents difference-in-differences estimates and
their interactions with different school attributes. All specifications include fixed effects by school and exam year. Treated (Control) schools are
defined as those with above median (below median) increase in their retention rates at 10th grade from the AUP years to the FRP years. The
outcome variables are average standardized SABER11 test scores for math and language subjects at year t. ClassSize measures the average number
of students per group at 10th grade. TeachersQual accounts for the proportion of teachers with a post-secondary education degree per school.
TeachersNewpay measures the proportion of teachers per school under the new pay scale regulated by the central government.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.
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Figure 6: Mechanisms: Variation in Teachers’ Composition
(a) 1-year prior exposure
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Notes: This figure plots the marginal effects from a difference-in-differences estimation, inter-
acted with the proportion of teachers under the new pay scale. each cap denotes confidence
intervals at the 95% level of a 10-percentage points increase in the proportion of teachers under
the new pay scale.
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IX. Appendix Tables and Figures (Not for Publication)
Figure A.1: Test Scores Residuals by Treatment Status
(a) Math Scores
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
sid
ua
ls 
− 
St
an
da
rd
ize
d 
Sc
or
es
 in
 (t+
1)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
control treated
(b) Language Scores
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Notes: This figure displays average residuals from an OLS regression where the dependent
variable is the average tests scores in year (t+1) as a function of school and exam-year fixed ef-
fects, and a set of school specific covariates. Panel (a) presents common trends on math scores’
average residuals between treated (dashed lines) and control (solid lines) schools. Panel (b)
shows similar trends on language test scores’ average residuals. Covariates considered in these
estimations include the first two lags of: Average class size at 10th grade, number of health,
support, and managerial non-academic staff per school, number of teachers with a professional
degree, number of teachers under the new and old government-regulated pay scales, proportion
of teachers under the new pay scale, and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
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Figure A.2: Test Scores Residuals by Treatment Status - Multiple Treatment Groups
(a) Math (Highly Treated)
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(b) Math (Medium Treated)
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
 
S
c
o
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
(
t
+
1
)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
control comparison group
(c) Math (Low Treated)
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(d) Language (Highly Treated)
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(e) Language (Medium Treated)
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(f) Language (Low Treated)
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Notes: This figure displays average residuals from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the average tests scores in year (t + 1) as
a function of school and exam-year fixed effects, and a set of school’s specific covariates. Panels (a)-(c) show math scores’ average residuals
for controls schools (solid lines) and highly treated (HighTreateds) medium treated (MiddleTreateds) and low treated (LowTreateds) schools. The
dashed vertical line denotes year 2009 where schools were notified that the AUP regime will no longer hold. The gray area denotes 2010-2012
years where the FRP regime was in place. Panels (d)-(f) present the same figures for language scores’ average residuals. Covariates considered in
these estimations include the first two lags of: Average class size at 10th grade, number of health, support, and managerial non-academic staff per
school, number of teachers with a professional degree, number of teachers under the new and old government-regulated pay scales, proportion of
teachers under the new pay scale, and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
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Table A.1: Common Trend Assumption Test by Treatment Heterogeneity Status
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HighTreateds×1[year=2008] 0.034 0.044 0.032 0.040
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
HighTreateds×1[year=2009] -0.021 -0.008 0.046 0.057*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
HighTreateds×1[year=2010] -0.047 -0.029 0.027 0.039
(0.037) (0.037) (0.031) (0.031)
MiddleTreateds×1[year=2008] 0.003 0.011 0.032 0.038
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
MiddleTreateds×1[year=2009] -0.028 -0.018 0.029 0.038
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
MiddleTreateds×1[year=2010] -0.080** -0.066* -0.002 0.008
(0.039) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032)
LowTreateds×1[year=2008] 0.000 0.006 -0.025 -0.021
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
LowTreateds×1[year=2009] -0.013 -0.003 0.024 0.031
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033)
LowTreateds×1[year=2010] -0.047 -0.035 -0.012 -0.002
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.033)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.150 0.156 0.096 0.103
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates No Yes No Yes
F-stat (9 , 6614) 1.051 0.968 1.064 1.220
p-value 0.397 0.464 0.386 0.277
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. This
table shows results for the common trend assumption test. All specifications include fixed ef-
fects by school and exam year. For matters of space, we only report the coefficients from the
pre-FRP trends years. The outcome variables are average standardized test scores for math and
language subjects measured for year t. Covariates include the first two lags of: average class
size at 10th grade, average managerial, health, and support staff per school, average number
of teachers under the old and new pay scales, average number of teachers with a professional
degree, proportion of teachers under the new pay scale, and proportion of teachers with a pro-
fessional degree. F-statistics reported correspond to the null hypothesis that pre-FRP regime
trends differences between control and treated schools are not statistically significant. Treated
and controls schools are defined as in the main text.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05. * p-value < 0.1.
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Table A.2: Placebo Test Using Multiple Treatment Groups: FRP Regime Started Before 2010
Math Scores Language Scores Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: FRP started in 2008
HighTreateds×FakeFRP2008,t−1 -0.037 -0.029 0.030 0.037
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
HighTreateds×FakeFRP2008,t−2 0.025 0.038 -0.027 -0.018
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
MiddleTreateds×FakeFRP2008,t−1 -0.029 -0.023 0.013 0.018
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
MiddleTreateds×FakeFRP2008,t−2 -0.034 -0.024 -0.058** -0.051*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
LowTreateds×FakeFRP2008,t−1 -0.012 -0.006 0.036 0.041
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
LowTreateds×FakeFRP2008,t−2 -0.004 0.001 -0.056* -0.053*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
Panel B: FRP started in 2007
HighTreateds×FakeFRP2007,t−1 0.035 0.046 0.031 0.040
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
HighTreateds×FakeFRP2007,t−2 -0.035 -0.022 -0.007 0.002
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026)
MiddleTreateds×FakeFRP2007,t−1 0.003 0.010 0.031 0.037
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
MiddleTreateds×FakeFRP2007,t−2 -0.057* -0.047 -0.049* -0.041
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026)
LowTreateds×FakeFRP2007,t−1 0.001 0.006 -0.026 -0.022
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
LowTreateds×FakeFRP2007,t−2 -0.016 -0.008 0.004 0.010
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693 35,693
R-squared 0.149 0.155 0.094 0.101 0.149 0.155 0.094 0.101
# Schools 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-stats (6; 6,614) 1.535 1.462 1.456 1.478 1.181 1.146 1.808 2.015
p-value 0.162 0.187 0.189 0.181 0.313 0.333 0.0934 0.0602
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. This
table presents results on placebo tests for the baseline difference-in-differences specification,
assuming the FRP started in year 2008. All specifications include fixed effects by school and
exam year. Treated (Control) schools are defined as those with above median (below median)
increase in their retention rates at 10th grade from the AUP years to the FRP years. The depen-
dent variables are average standardized math and language SABER11’s test scores. F-statistics
reported correspond to the joint test of the null hypothesis that placebo effects are not different
from zero. Covariates include the first two lags of: average class size at 10th grade, average
managerial, health, and support staff per school, average number of teachers under the old and
new pay scales, average number of teachers with a professional degree, proportion of teachers
under the new pay scale, and proportion of teachers with a professional degree.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05. * p-value < 0.1.
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Table A.3: Falsification Test - 1500 Control Schools as Treated
Math Scores Language Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max
Treateds×FRPt−1
Coefficient 0.001 0.026 -0.067 0.079 0.001 0.035 -0.108 0.100
Std. Error 0.029 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.040 0.000 0.040 0.040
t-statistic 0.705 0.516 0.001 2.700 0.696 0.529 0.000 2.694
P(|t|> T5%) 0.024 0.153 0.000 1.000 0.027 0.162 0.000 1.000
Treateds×FRPt−2
Coefficient -0.001 0.025 -0.081 0.069 -0.000 0.031 -0.100 0.095
Std. Error 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.027 0.035 0.000 0.035 0.035
t-statistic 0.741 0.539 0.001 2.992 0.698 0.536 0.000 2.866
P(|t|> T5%) 0.026 0.159 0.000 1.000 0.028 0.165 0.000 1.000
# Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Notes: Based on 1000 replications. This table reports difference-in-difference estimates on the
control group sample when we randomly allocate treatment status to 1500 control schools. All
specifications include fixed effects by school and exam year. The outcome variables are average
standardized SABER11 test scores for math and language subjects at year t. The coefficients
of interest are the interaction of an indicator of (false) treatment status with a set of dummy
variables FRPt−1 and FRPt−2, measuring the exposure to the FRP regime one and two years
before the SABER11 exam is taken, respectively.
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